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Abstract
Hybrid Threats is a concept that has entered to many states official documents 
and security strategies. Both the EU and NATO have taken serious measures to coun-
ter hybrid threats related activity. This special issue on digital communication and 
hybrid threats aims to advance our understanding of how hybrid threat actors use 
and can potentially exploit the information environment for targeting our democrat-
ic societies and decision-making processes at different levels for different purposes. 
Information and communication technologies have brought remarkable advances in 
the ways we obtain information and build awareness on the world and its events and 
interact with the others, but at the same time, these developments create opportu-
nities for conducting information and influence operations with a hostile intent at 
an unprecedented scales. Political warfare, active measures, and communication-led 
covert actions operations are not new, and propaganda has been used throughout 
the history in conflict and war like situations. However, today our digital commu-
nication environment and the communication tools that we employ for legitimate 
purposes are also being employed by hostile authoritarian actors and/or their prox-
ies at a scale that has interfered in our democratic processes like elections, to erode 
trust in our institutions, polarize and divide our societies in unhealthy ways and sow 
animosities between states and international partner countries. Since human beings 
make decisions based on their representations about the world and the information 
available through interpersonal symbolic interactions and through the different me-
dia, information can be deliberately utilized for a malign activity to produce cogni-
tive, affective and behavioural effects.
Key Words: Hybrid threats; Hybrid warfare; Digital communication; Disinformation; 
Strategic communication; Security; Intelligence
Resumen 
La amenaza híbrida es un concepto que aparece en documentos oficiales y estrate-
gias de seguridad de los estados. Tanto la UE como la OTAN han tomado medidas 
serias para contrarrestar la actividad relacionada con las amenazas híbridas. Este 
monográfico sobre comunicación digital y amenazas híbridas tiene como objetivo 
avanzar en la comprensión de cómo los actores de amenazas híbridas utilizan y 
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pueden potencialmente explotar el entorno de la información para atacar las so-
ciedades democráticas y los procesos de toma de decisiones en diferentes niveles, 
para diferentes propósitos. Las TIC han traído avances notables en la forma en que 
obtenemos información y construimos conciencia sobre el mundo y sus eventos e in-
teractuamos con los demás, pero al mismo tiempo crean oportunidades para realizar 
operaciones  e influenciar con una intención hostil. La guerra política, las medidas 
activas y las acciones encubiertas dirigidas por la comunicación no son nuevas, y la 
propaganda se ha utilizado a lo largo de la historia en situaciones de conflicto y gue-
rra. Estas herramientas son empleadas por actores autoritarios hostiles y/o en una 
escala que ha interferido en procesos democráticos como las elecciones, erosiona la 
confianza en las instituciones, polariza y divide las sociedades de manera malsana. 
Dado que los seres humanos toman decisiones basadas en sus representaciones 
sobre el mundo y la información disponible a través de interacciones simbólicas 
interpersonales y a través de los diferentes medios, la información puede ser utili-
zada deliberadamente para actividades malignas que produzcan efectos cognitivos, 
afectivos y conductuales.
Palabras clave: Amenazas híbridas; Guerra híbrida; Comunicación digital; Desinfor-
mación; Comunicación estratégica; Seguridad; Inteligencia
Resumo
Ameaças híbridas é um conceito que entrou em documentos oficiais e estratégias 
de segurança de muitos estados. Tanto a UE como a OTAN tomaram medidas sérias 
para combater a atividade relacionada com ameaças híbridas. Esta edição especial 
sobre comunicação digital e ameaças híbridas tem como objetivo avançar nossa 
compreensão de como os atores de ameaças híbridas usam e podem explorar o am-
biente de informações para direcionar nossas sociedades democráticas e processos 
de tomada de decisão em diferentes níveis para diferentes fins. As tecnologias de 
informação e comunicação trouxeram avanços notáveis  nas maneiras como obtemos 
informações e construímos consciência sobre o mundo e seus eventos e interagimos 
com os outros, mas, ao mesmo tempo, esses desenvolvimentos criam oportunidades 
para conduzir informações e influenciar operações com uma intenção hostil em um 
escala sem precedentes. A guerra política, as medidas ativas e as operações de ações 
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secretas conduzidas pela comunicação não são novas, e a propaganda foi usada 
ao longo da história em conflitos e situações semelhantes à guerra. No entanto, 
hoje nosso ambiente de comunicação digital e as ferramentas de comunicação que 
empregamos para fins legítimos também estão sendo empregados por atores auto-
ritários hostis e / ou seus representantes em escala que tem interferido em nossos 
processos democráticos como eleições, corroendo a confiança em nossas instituições, 
polarizando e dividindo nossas sociedades de forma prejudicial à saúde e semeiam 
animosidades entre Estados e países parceiros internacionais. 
Palavras chave: Ameaças híbridas; Guerra híbrida; Comunicação digital; Desinfor-
mação; Comunicação estratégica; Segurança; Inteligência
Presentation
In 1961 John F Kennedy addressed the American Newspaper Publishers Associa-
tion. He described the then security environment in the following way:
It requires a change in outlook, a change in tactics, a change in missions – 
by the government, by the people, by every businessman or labor leader, and 
by every newspaper. For we are opposed around the world by a monolithic 
and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its 
sphere of influence – on infiltration instead of invasion, on subversion instead 
of elections, on intimidation instead of free choice, on guerrillas by night in-
stead of armies by day. It is a system which has conscripted vast human and 
material resources into the building of a tightly knit, highly efficient machine 
that combines military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, scientific and polit-
ical operations. Its preparations are concealed, not published. Its mistakes are 
buried, not headlined. Its dissenters are silenced, not praised. No expenditure is 
questioned, no rumor is printed, no secret is revealed. (Kennedy, 1961)
Kennedy’s speech highlighted the challenge the West felt then. He described the 
Cold War environment. Today the EU and NATO countries are facing something simi-
lar. Cold War is history today as is also the battle between socialism and capitalism, 
which characterized the Cold War. The concept of Hybrid Threats is born out of the 
need to be able to describe today’s security environment. As Frank Hoffmann, often 
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seen as the father of the term hybrid warfare, has said; “New language and new 
terms aids us in thinking differently and characterizing what is truly new, hopefully 
without overlooking what is enduring in war. A new lexicon captures the changes 
better than hanging on to old terms with new meanings” (Hoffmann, 2010).
Today the Hybrid threats is a concept that describes current security challeng-
es. It has entered to many states’ official documents and security strategies. Both 
the EU and NATO have taken serious measures to counter hybrid threats related 
activity. For the EU, “the concept aims to capture the mixture of coercive and 
subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, 
military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by 
state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the 
threshold of formally declared warfare”. (European Commission 2016: 2) As stated 
in NATO Secretary General’s Annual Report, hostile adversaries “do not have to take 
to the battlefield to inflict damage on their adversaries” but foreign powers “can 
make political and strategic gains in other ways, such as spreading disinformation, 
launching cyber- attacks, and using deception and sabotage” (NATO, 2019: 29). 
These activities challenge not only the traditional distinctions between peace and 
war but also our understanding of what is peace and what is war. Hybrid Threats 
put civilians and the different departments of public administrations in affected 
countries –not only those with security and defence mandates– at the forefront of 
security as potential targets of hostile actors that scan for existing vulnerabilities 
or latent social, political, economic or historical cleavages to be exploited, while 
also seeking opportunities to create new vulnerabilities. This is a change, not per-
haps so much from the Cold War, but from the post-Cold War world.
 Internal and external security have started to mix in a new way. The challenge 
is not coming from outside but from within but initiated by an outside actor. 
Hybrid threat actors can target vulnerabilities of a state and specific societies in 
different domains through a combination of activities in multiple domains and in 
different phases. The conceptual model jointly developed by the European Centre 
of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats  and the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission identifies thirteen domains (infrastructure, cyber, space, 
economy, military and defence, culture, social, public administration, legal, intel-
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ligence, diplomacy, political, and the information domain) three phases (priming, 
destabilization, and coercion) and four activities across a spectrum (interference, 
influence, operations/campaigns, and warfare). Accordingly, interference and in-
fluence belong to the first phase of priming while influence and operations cor-
respond to the destabilization phase. Operations and warfare are features of the 
coercion phase (Giannopoulos, Smith and Theocharidou 2020). From this perspec-
tive and framework, disinformation campaigns affect multiple domains including 
the information domain, but also other closely linked domains such as the cyber, 
social, political, intelligence, administration and cultural domains among others. 
This special issue on digital communication and hybrid threats aims to advance 
our understanding of how hybrid threat actors use and can potentially exploit the 
information environment for targeting our democratic societies and decision-making 
processes at different levels and for different purposes. Information and communica-
tion technologies have brought remarkable advances in the ways we obtain informa-
tion and build awareness on the world and its events and interact with the others, 
but at the same time these developments create opportunities for conducting infor-
mation and influence operations with a hostile intent at an unprecedented scale. 
Malicious activities in the information domain by state, non-state, and state-
backed actors are an essential part of hybrid threat relating action. The EU’s Coun-
cil conclusions December 2019 used the concept “manipulative interference” to 
describe the activity that has been detected in the information domain and as-
sessed as harmful as well as undermining democratic state systems. Political war-
fare, active measures, and communication-led covert actions operations are not 
new, and propaganda has been used throughout history in conflict and war like 
situations. However, today our digital communication environment and the com-
munication tools that we employ for legitimate purposes are also being employed 
by hostile authoritarian actors and/or their proxies at a scale that has interfered 
in our democratic processes like elections, erode trust in our institutions, polarize 
and divide our societies in unhealthy ways and sow animosities between states 
and international partner countries. Since human beings make decisions based 
on their representations about the world and the information available through 
interpersonal symbolic interactions and through the different media, information 
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can be deliberately utilized for a malign activity to produce cognitive, affective 
and behavioural effects. Disinformation generated in a digital environment un-
dermines more than traditional media (printed press and TV) the capacity of hu-
man beings to acquire a correct representation of events, institutions, and social 
processes, and make informed decisions affecting their communities and their 
own lives. At the same time, information can be disseminated in a deliberate way 
through multiple different channels, including social media networks, for percep-
tion management purposes so that a target state and their political leaders make 
decisions that benefit in some way or the other the goals of the hostile actors. 
Today’s disinformation also hinders the ability of intelligence collection and anal-
ysis systems to provide analysis and assessments on a number of security issues. 
The volume, channels and speed information has, is unprecedented, challenging 
the intelligence cycles. Multi-domain activities and attacks are likely to be sup-
ported by the employment of information influencing activities that may seeks to 
increase uncertainty by introducing noise against intelligence production systems 
or by conducting activities in unattributable ways to covert sponsors.  ICT and dig-
ital communication tools and channels with Artificial Intelligence added into the 
picture provide unique opportunities for conducting coordinated hostile activities 
that exploit the vulnerabilities of our democratic societies in targeted campaigns 
against individuals, institutions, and societies by the means of information and 
decision-making influencing. 
While the communication content of symbolic interactions in social media plat-
forms has varying degrees of visibility, coordinated inauthentic behaviours and 
the use of cyber-proxies challenge detection and attribution. The “weaponization” 
of information by hybrid threat actors can adopt multiple forms and raises the 
question of how to prevent, counter, and respond to it without undermining the 
democratic rights and liberties of our societies and how to detect the real threats 
from the polarization that always exist in democratic societies. Advancing the 
knowledge and understanding of hybrid threats through research and analysis is a 
prerequisite for developing effective policies and taking actions aimed at counter-
ing them. In these endeavours the role and awareness civil society and individuals 
is key, particularly when it comes to developing resilience societies against disin-
formation campaigns and hostile information influencing. 
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The special issue addresses this challenge of furthering hybrid threats from 
the information, cyber and digital communication perspective. It is important to 
understand the strengths of our digital ecosystems and societies as well as the sys-
temic vulnerabilities of democratic societies. Equally important is to understand 
hybrid threats; the processes, methods, and tools by which hybrid threats target 
in coordinated campaigns and activities of democratic states.
The role of academic research becomes even more important than before to be 
able to show patterns and thinking behind Hybrid Threats. There is a need to un-
derstand better the phenomenon, those behind the activity and its changing na-
ture. In this picture equally important become the collaboration between academia 
and practitioners. The academic research needs to be connected to practitioner ex-
perience and hand-on knowledge. Notes should be compared. The key in counter-
ing Hybrid Threats is the framework of whole-of-government and whole-of-society 
responses. This is central when it comes to detecting, countering and attributing 
malign disinformation. When designing the Call for papers for this special issue, 
we advanced the following list of research questions and potential themes and top-
ics for a hybrid threats research agenda from a digital communication perspective.
Topics
• Generative medias and Deepfakes
• Reflexive control and active measures in the cyberspace
• Policies and strategies to counter digital Information operations
• Inauthentic behavior and amplification
• Early identification, detection, and attribution of coordinated activities by 
threat actors
• Disinformation, divisive topic themes, and conspiracy theories in digital and 
traditional media
• Technology and Digital communication trends
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• Awareness, digital society resilience to disinformation, and deterrence
• Open-source information and fact-checking
• Measurement and evaluation of disinformation effects
• Education and training to combat disinformation and communication-led 
hostile activities
Research Questions
• What opportunities for malicious information influencing do the digital me-
dia ecosystem provide?
• Who are the main hybrid threat actors and how can they exploit the existing 
vulnerabilities of our societies?
• What technological developments like AI and automation are likely to be 
exploited in hostile strategic communication activities?
• How technologies can be used to detect and counter hybrid threats in the 
information domain?
While non a single special issue could realistically aspire to entirely address 
such a broad list of topics, the contributions of international scholars from Esto-
nia, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, United States, includ-
ed in the present issue of Icono 14 offer good coverage of research articles on many 
of the topics above. 
All the articles in this issue highlight the fact that today’s security environment 
is very complex and multidimensional whether we are talking about theoretical 
approach, describing case-studies or looking at it from a practitioners’ perspective. 
This character is inherent to hybrid threats too, which makes it difficult concep-
tualize and contextualize.  This complexity requires similar conceptual tools and 
frameworks than multidisciplinary approaches. The multiple domains that can be 
potentially be targeted and affected means that without the multidisciplinary 
approach something will be missing in the analysis. This is highlighted in the ar-
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ticles too; the role of gender and intersectionality for understanding how hybrid 
threats operate, the role of cyber, how old strategic culture traditions like Soviet 
reflexive control concept is still alive today, how psychological aspects need to 
be understood and used to build a defence, how we can trace narratives but how 
difficult they are to attribute, what needs to be taken into consideration about 
strategic communication and so on. Together the articles paint a picture of a very 
complex information landscape where new and old are mixed, where new tools are 
in use, where targets vary according to the purpose and where those not part of 
defence and security establishments are an important part of both resilience and 
being targeted.
  The articles of this special issue are being organized according to an internal 
logic that first present conceptual and theoretical contributions, followed by case 
studies, and finally contributing articles focused on responses to disinformation 
as part of hybrid threats. 
Firstly, Håkan Gunneriusson’s contributing article “Hybrid warfare: develop-
ment, historical context, challenges and interpretations” examines the emergence 
of the term hybrid warfare and its evolution as empirical situations evolved chal-
lenging initial conceptual elaborations and argues on the significance of Russia’s 
strategy of reflexive control against the West highlighting the importance of the 
cyber domain with this regard. Gunneriussons outlook is not very positive for the 
future. In his view, the advances that both Russia and China have made can in the 
worst case challenge the whole international system unpredictable consequenc-
es. He makes some comparisons to the Cold War but sees that today’s ideological 
battle is between the democratic states and authoritarian. The slow awakening of 
the West has been due to the globalized economy. In Gunneriusson article it is 
highlighted well how historical knowledge is important, analogies should not be 
taken always as one to one and how strategic interests can also hinder responses 
and /or threat perceptions.
Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv in her article “Identity, stability, Hybrid Threats and 
Disinformation” adopts a concepts-oriented approach and argues on the relevance 
of and target civilians through disinformation with the aim of destabilizing soci-
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eties, fueling polarization, and unrest and conflict. She shows how important an 
understanding of different concepts is when trying to make sense of our security 
environment. Hoogensen- Gjørv’s argument is that when examining the ways  in 
which  men  and  women  may  engage  in  hybrid threats/ warfare  differently, and 
how they might be targeted differently, allows us to think about different  levels 
and  strategies  of  resilience  and  resistance. Her claim is that we could expect 
that societies which were more gender equal might be more resilient to the hybrid 
threat activity which involves weaponizing social divisions to create civil conflict.
Ivo Jurvee’s and Uku Arold’s article shows the ways our security environment 
has changed through cyber and how we should be thinking about psychological 
defence from today’s perspective. They show how Estonia has tackled the new 
security realm with a comprehensive national defence that is built upon under-
standing that the society itself is object of security and should provide appropriate 
safeguards and responses. Estonian conceptualisations of national cybersecurity, 
psychological defence, and strategic communications are elaborated in the light 
of actual seminal threat situations. In this context system-centric cyber-defence 
and value-centric psychological defence complement each other. In Jurvee’s and 
Arold’s article not only the case of Estonia becomes clear but also the multidisci-
plinary approach that is needed to counter Hybrid Threats. 
Julian Richards’ article shows how disinformation takes dominance in the Brit-
ish information space before the Scottish independence and Brexit referendum as 
well as in and around some other events. He highlights how difficult it is to differ-
entiate between manipulative interference in the sense that is typical to Hybrid 
Threat activity and locally generated opinions. According to Richards “it cannot 
be denied that some degree of organised disinformation, a significant proportion 
of it conducted at the hands of the IRA in St Petersburg, has been going on”. 
This highlights also the importance of open source academic research’s role when 
learning more about actors behind Hybrid Threat activity. He concludes that the 
purpose of the activities is to “create a general fog of uncertainty and division in 
Western societies which can, in the longer term, have a strategic effect on politics 
and its evolution. Such developments also cause a generally destabilising effect 
in Western polities, whereby more extreme political expressions start to challenge 
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normative, mainstream views. These are issues not to be taken lightly”. This is a 
strong recommendation to continue tracking activities through research but also 
actively taking action to counter it as well as build long term resilience against 
such activities.
Ellery G Cushman and Kiril Avramov analyze in their article sexuality and gen-
der-based narratives in Russian and pro-Russian disinformation. By surveying the 
disinfo cases database of the Strategic Communication and Information Analysis 
Division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) from 2015 to 2020, Cush-
man and Avramov identify 25 specific narratives and seven broad metanarratives 
in the collected sample (N=185). The broad metanarratives that emerged from 
disinformation stories in their analysis include: “Western perversion of tradition-
al morals and resulting collapse,” “Disintegration of traditional gender norms in 
the West,” “Western subversion via ‘gender based ideology’,” “Russia as the savior 
of traditional Christendom,” “Sexual predation by an ‘Other’,” the “Complicity of 
Western elites, media, and judicial systems,” and the “Extreme tolerance in the 
West”. They conclude that “Russian and pro-Russian outlets  utilize sexuality and 
gender-based narratives in disinformation operations because of their extremely 
potent emotionally based content and their ability to reuse storylines and narra-
tives in different cultural contexts with only minor corrections” and include the 
recommendation of conducting further research on the ways these sexualities and 
gender-based narratives are being modified and tailored to target the specific fea-
tures of national cultures.    
Ileana Surdu, Mihaela Teodor  Cristina Ivan  and Irena Chiru bring in the practi-
tioners approach. They present the results of an empirical sociological study with-
in the CRESCEnt project (Mind the gap in media coverage and strategic commu-
nication in case of security threats) that aims to identify elements of enhancing 
critical thinking, responsible communication, and accountable behaviour. Three 
European states were targeted by the study: Romania, Spain, and Greece, while 
28 practitioners in communication, intelligence and security and law enforcement 
contributed to the research with significant input on topics related to ethical, 
successful, and strategic communication characteristics. They explain the impor-
tance of ethical strategic communication and conclude with some guidelines for 
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the practitioners like “an institutional spokesperson or a journalist while conduct-
ing press releases or press conferences, or reporting to the public, must be able to 
establish and increase trust, cooperation, and awareness of the public, to develop 
a sincere and equitable relationship with the media”. This highlights the fact that 
the way information is delivered counts perhaps more in today’s media environ-
ment than the substance or facts.
Finally, Alba García-Ortega and José Alberto García-Aviles, “explore the poten-
tial of five newsgames designed to educate users against disinformation”. Their ar-
ticle employs a qualitative matrix as a methodological tool for analysing a sample 
of newsgames that includes the newsgames Guerra a la mentira (RTVE Lab, 2017), 
iReporter (BBC, 2018), #Hacked (Al Jazeera News, 2016), Factitious (The American 
University Game Lab, 2017), and Bad News (DROG, 2018). The authors conclude 
that newsgames can be useful devices to raise awareness on fake news and counter 
disinformation on public issues. 
The seven articles of this special issue give us insights to the role of digital 
communications and hybrid threats, both 21st-century phenomena that has chal-
lenged our societies, in today’s security environment. Hybrid Threats present us a 
security puzzle, which we are still learning to respond to. The articles show how 
our information environment can be used against us but also how it can be our 
strength. There is still more to be discovered, but it’s clear that academic research 
has a very important place in enhancing understanding, building resilience and 
finding ways to counter the Hybrid Threats. For the comprehensive understanding 
of the changes that have occurred theorization and conceptualization of differ-
ent terms and concepts is needed, they need to be validated and examined in 
case-studies and then the results need to be connected to the practitioners and 
private sector. Three of the articles in this special issue are produced inside the 
framework of the EU-HYBNET Horizon 2020 project funded by the European Com-
mission (No. 883054). The EU-HYBNET is a pan-European network of practitioners, 
stakeholders, academics, industry players and SME actors. The networks, that bring 
different actors together, are needed to find new innovative and creative solutions 
to the challenge Hybrid Threats present.
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